OpenTitan's provisioning setup now uses field-programmable gate array (FPGA) images built from the exact source revision sent to manufacturing. The previous images came from a later orchestrator release, so the emulated device could contain different read-only memory (ROM) code and a different OpenTitan Big Number Accelerator, the block that performs cryptographic arithmetic.
Provisioning is where a factory gives each security chip its unique identity, keys, and lifecycle state. OpenTitan runs that process against FPGA development boards before using it on silicon. lowRISC changed the pinned source tag and replaced both board images, a six-line diff that closes a serious evidence gap: a passing factory flow now exercises the binaries present in the taped-out chip rather than a nearby software release.
Hardware teams often pin compilers and test scripts while leaving an emulation image labeled only by release name. Security silicon deserves stricter provenance because the factory cannot patch a chip's immutable startup code after packaging. Before the next production run, teams should record the tapeout revision beside every emulator image and reject provisioning tests when those identifiers differ.